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January 11, 2011 began the tenth year of existence of the deten-
tion center at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 
(“Guantanamo” or “GTMO”).  In human-being terms, what this 
means is that large numbers of men have been detained by the U.S. 
military for almost a decade, in prison-like conditions, without trial.  
In a pre-9/11 world, a “Guantanamo” and the idea of “detention 
without trial” would have been seen as decidedly un-American and a 
violation of our democratic values.1  Over the last decade, however, 
  
 ∗ Kristine A. Huskey is the Founder and former Director of the National Secu-
rity Clinic at The University of Texas School of Law and the author of Justice at 
Guantánamo: One Woman’s Odyssey and Her Crusade for Human Rights.  As an 
attorney at Shearman & Sterling, she and her colleagues were the first lawyers, 
along with The Center for Constitutional Rights, to represent Guantanamo detai-
nees and to file habeas petitions on behalf of detainees in federal court in 2002.  
The litigation resulted in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), the first of the Su-
preme Court cases to grant rights to detainees at Guantanamo.  Over the last nine 
years, Huskey has represented nineteen Guantanamo detainees in federal court.   
 1. Recognizing that before 9/11 the United States has detained people without 
trial on the basis of dangerousness in cases of mental insanity, juveniles, sexual 
offenders, and other scenarios, this sentiment is not meant to imply that detention 
without trial did not exist prior to 9/11.  See generally Paul H. Robinson, Punish-
 
File: Huskey- Vol. 9, Iss. 2, V3 Created on:  3/13/2011 1:11:00 AM Last Printed: 3/22/2011 12:26:00 AM 
184    UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 9, No. 2   
“Guantanamo” and the practice of long-term detention without trial 
for terrorism suspects (or, “preventive detention”), have evolved into 
institutions of American society that are now perfectly acceptable, 
indeed desirable to some, and of little concern to many.  Indeed, how 
did we get here, and where are we going?  Will the Guantanamo de-
tention center close down in the near future or remain open, housing 
men indefinitely in the war against terrorism?  More significantly, 
will preventive detention continue its current trajectory, becoming a 
permanent fixture in America’s national security landscape?   
I.  HOW DID WE GET HERE? (AN ABRIDGED HISTORY OF A 
DETENTION CENTER) 
At the outset, I must confess that the story of Guantanamo and 
the fate of the men there have become somewhat personal, as I have 
represented Guantanamo detainees for close to nine years—almost 
as long as the detention camp has been around.  Over these nine 
years, I played a part in the painfully long litigation journey that be-
gan in 2002 and paused briefly with Rasul v. Bush2 in 2004, when 
the United States Supreme Court held that the Guantanamo detainees 
have a right to habeas corpus under the federal habeas statute.3  Four 
more years of litigation resulted in Boumediene v. Bush4 in 2008, 
when the Supreme Court held that the detainees have a right to ha-
beas corpus under the U.S. Constitution.5  I have witnessed Congress 
pass several bills in attempt to restrict the rights of the detainees, for 
example, by stripping them of the right to challenge their detention 
under the habeas statute, such as in the Detainee Treatment Act of 
  
ing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 1429 (2001). 
 2. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 3. Id. at 483 (concluding that the detainees have a right to challenge their deten-
tions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)). 
 4. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 5. Id. at 771 (concluding the detainees have a right to challenge their detentions 
under the Suspension Clause, Article One, Section 9, Clause 2, of the United 
States Constitution). 
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20056 and the Military Commissions Act of 2006.7  I have seen nu-
merous military commissions begin, only to falter due to the Su-
preme Court declaring them invalid or the executive branch halting 
them.8  One of my clients, Omar Khadr—the young Canadian citizen 
picked up at age fifteen, imprisoned, and treated as an adult—faced 
no less than three different military commissions, each one operating 
under different rules.9 
  
 6. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 28, & 42 U.S.C.). 
 7. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 
(2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, & 28 U.S.C.).  
 8. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 625, 634 (2006) (concluding that the 
President’s establishment of the military commissions by his November 13, 2001 
military order violated the U.S. Armed Forces’ Uniform Code of Military Justice 
and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions); see Press Release, The White 
House, Statement of President Barack Obama on Military Commissions (May 15, 
2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-of-President-
Barack-Obama-on-Military-Commissions; William Glaberson, Obama Orders 
Halt to Prosecutions at Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/washington/22gitmo.html.  
 9.  On November 7, 2005, Omar Khadr was charged under President Bush’s 
military order of November 13, 2001.  See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Cer-
tain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833–36 (Nov. 13, 
2001) [hereinafter Detention Military Order]; Charges, United States v. Khadr, 
(Military Comm’n Nov. 4, 2005), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Nov2005/d20051104khadr.pdf; see also Alan 
Freeman & Jeff Sallot, U.S. Won’t Seek Execution of Khadr, GLOBE AND MAIL 
(Nov. 9, 2005), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/us-wont-seek-
execution-of-khadr/article919460.  On April 5, 2007, new charges under the Mili-
tary Commissions Act of 2006 were referred against Khadr.  See Charge Sheet, 
Omar Ahmed Khard, U.S. Dept. of Defense (Apr. 24, 2007), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Apr2007/Khadrreferral.pdf.  After some delay due 
to the Administration halting the military commissions, Khadr’s military trial re-
sumed and was then also subject to the Military Commissions Act of 2009 and the 
new rules under the revised military commissions manual.  Emergency Petition for 
Writ of Mandamus to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia, In re Khadr, 131 S. Ct. 44 (2010) (No. 10-5691); see also Spencer Acker-
man, Hours Before Khadr Hearing Begins, Gates Signs Manual for Military 
Commissions, WASH. INDEP. (Apr. 27, 2010), http://washingtonindependent.com/ 
83345/hours-before-khadr-hearing-begins-gates-signs-manual-for-military-
commissions; Colin Perkel, U.S. Supreme Court Asked to Stop Omar Khadr War 
Crimes Hearing, THESTAR.COM (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.thestar.com/special 
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Over the years, I have been to Guantanamo countless times to 
visit with my clients, most of whom had been there since early 2002.  
I have seen my clients on hunger strike, including one client who 
dropped to ninety-seven pounds before he chose quitting his strike 
over the restraint chair.10  I have heard stories of attempted and suc-
cessful suicides, as well as whispers of homicide, from my fellow 
habeas counsel.  In fact, over the years, a total of six men have died 
at Guantanamo while in the custody of the United States.11  By the 
end of President Bush’s second term, it was not entirely surprising 
that over a majority of the American public favored closing the “le-
gal black hole,” a fifteen percent increase since 2005.12 
When Barack Obama won the presidential election in November 
2008, those who were in favor of closing Guantanamo cheered, as he 
had promised to close the detention center during his campaign.13  
But, in fact, John McCain had also supported closure during his 




 10. See generally Kristine Huskey & Stephen N. Xenakis, Hunger Strikes: Chal-
lenges to the Guantanamo Detainee Health Care Policy, 30 WHITTIER L. REV. 783 
(2009) (discussing the hunger strikes at Guantanamo and related legal and ethical 
issues thereof). 
 11. William Fisher, Families Sue Over Guantanamo Deaths, INTER PRESS 
SERVICE NEWS AGENCY (March 16, 2010), http://www.ipsnews.net/ 
news.asp?idnews=50733; Andy Worthington, Guantanamo: The Definitive Pris-
oner List, ALTERNET (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.alternet.org/rights/145060/ 
Guantanamo%3A_the_definitive_prisoner_list.  
 12. See, e.g., CNN Poll: Americans Split on Closing Guantanamo Bay Prison, 
CNN (Jan. 21, 2009), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2009/01/21/cnn-poll-
americans-split-on-closing-Guantanamo-bay-prison.  Guantanamo was aptly 
coined a “legal black hole” by Johan Steyn (judicial member of the House of 
Lords) at the Twenty-Seventh F.S. Mann Lecture delivered in London on Novem-
ber 23, 2003.  See Johan Steyn, Guantánamo: A Monstrous Failure of Justice, 
INT’L HERALD TRIB. (Nov. 27, 2003), available at http://www.common 
dreams.org/views03/1127-08.htm. 
 13. See Jack Cloonan & Sarah Mendelson, How To Close Guantanamo, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 30, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/11/28/AR2008112802371.html; Elizabeth White, Obama 
Says Gitmo Facility Should Close, USA TODAY, June 24, 2007, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/2007-06-24-2596668182_x.htm. 
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the detention center should be closed.14  But, saying it does not al-
ways make it so, especially for a politician.  Thus, when President 
Obama boldly issued an executive order on January 22, 2009, just 
two days after his inauguration, which called for the closure of the 
detention center at Guantanamo within a year, even those in favor of 
such action were probably surprised at how quickly it came.15  Ob-
ama’s own party appeared to be surprised by the order as well, be-
cause shortly afterward, a Democrat-controlled Congress passed a 
supplemental appropriations bill that included several restrictions on 
transferring detainees to the United States and other countries.16  
This spending bill, introduced in May 2009, provided an opportunity 
to secure funding for the closure of Guantanamo; however, the Ob-
ama Administration had not come up with a plan for the closure.  
Ultimately, the Senate voted ninety to six against including in the 
bill the $80 million requested by the White House to close Guanta-
namo.17  
  
 14. See, e.g., Foon Rhee, McCain Proposes: New Global Coalition, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Mar. 27, 2008, at 17A; President Bush Participates in Press Availability 
at 2006 U.S.-EU Summit, WHITE HOUSE (June 21, 2006), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060621-6.html.  General David 
Petraeus, head of U.S. Army Central Command, has also supported closing Guan-
tanamo.  Greg Bluestein, Petraeus Supports Closure of Guantanamo, ARMY 
TIMES (May 29, 2009), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/05/ap_petraeus_ 
gitmoclosing_052909w/. 
 15. Executive Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 27, 2009). 
 16. Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, 123 Stat. 1859 
(2009).  Section 1403 prohibited the release of any Guantanamo detainee into the 
United States, restricted the transfer of any detainee to the United States for prose-
cution or detention without submitting to Congress a plan, analysis, and justifica-
tion regarding such transfer, and restricted the transfer of any detainee to a foreign 
country without submitting to Congress a risk assessment.  Id. § 1403(a)–(e).  
Several amendments, such as S. Amdt. 1133, S. Amdt. 1136, S. Amdt. 1140, and 
S. Amdt. 1144, were introduced, some by Democrats, which were intended to 
severely restrict the ability to close Guantanamo or the rights of detainees.  See 
Proposed Amendments to H.R. 2346, Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, 
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2346&tab= 
amendments. 
 17. See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn, Funds to Close Guantánamo Denied, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 20, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/21/us/politics/ 
21detain.html?_r=1.  On the vote, Senator Dick Durbin retorted that the Demo-
crats were “being asked to defend a plan that hasn’t been announced.”  Senators 
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Subsequent events only helped to grow and solidify opposition to 
shuttering the prison.  In November 2009, Attorney General Eric 
Holder announced his intention to try Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 
and other alleged 9/11 conspirators in civilian court under federal 
criminal terrorism statutes.18  A month later, the Administration an-
nounced plans to purchase and retrofit a corrections facility in 
Thompson, Illinois with the intent to transfer Guantanamo detainees 
there for trial and/or long-term detention.19  Both announcements 
caused a flurry of protests and heated action by several members of 
Congress.20  The backlash was so great that the planned 9/11 trials 
were put on hold and Congress made clear that it would not fund the 
Thompson facility.21 
Another political firestorm erupted when the only civilian trial of 
a Guantanamo detainee to occur so far concluded with a surprising 
result in November 2010.  Ahmed Ghailani, charged with 285 counts 
of various crimes, including murder, for the 1998 East African em-
  
Reject Closing GTMO Without Plan, USA TODAY, May 19, 2009, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-05-19-gitmo_N.htm. 
 18. Attorney General Announces Forum Decisions for Guantanamo Detainees, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Nov. 13, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ 
ag-speech-091113.html (statement of Eric Holder) (last visited Feb. 22, 2011). 
 19. See, e.g., Peter Slevin, U.S. to Announce Transfer of Detainees to Ill. Prison, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/12/15/AR2009121500095.html. 
 20.  See, e.g., Daphne Eviatar, Protesters in New York City Rally Against 9/11 
Trials, Call for Holder to Resign, WASH. INDEP. (Dec. 5, 2009), 
http://washingtonindependent.com/69775/protesters-in-new-york-city-rally-
against-911-trials-call-for-holder-to-resign; Mimi Hall & Judy Keen, Plan to Move 
Gitmo Detainees to Illinois Sparks Concerns, USA TODAY, Dec.  16, 2009, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-12-16-illinois-prison-
terrorists_N.htm; Kasie Hunt, Senators Try to Block Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 
Trial, POLITICO (Feb. 2, 2010), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0210/ 
32382.html; Tim Taliaferro, GOP Moves To Block Gitmo Detainees From Coming 
to Illinois Prison, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 16, 2009), http://www.huffington 
post.com/2009/11/16/gop-moves-to-block-gitmo_n_359792.html. 
 21.  See, e.g., Stephanie Condon, Holder: Politics Has Delayed KSM Trial, CBS 
NEWS (July 11, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/07/09/ftn/main 
6662906.shtml; Charlie Savage, Delay Expected on Illinois Plan for Detainees, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2009, at A1; Katherine Skiba & Peter Nicholas, Funding 
Problems Delay Obama’s Thompson Prison Plan, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2009, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/24/nation/la-na-prison-funding24-2009dec24.  
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bassy bombings, was ultimately convicted of only one count—
conspiracy to damage or destroy U.S. property—and given a life 
sentence.22  While some characterized the conviction as a victory for 
the American justice system and the rule of law, it seemed that the 
loudest viewpoint was that the one-count conviction was a travesty 
and that the verdict clearly demonstrated that trials of suspected ter-
rorists, at least those detained at Guantanamo, should be by military 
commission on a Caribbean island.23  Thus, the entire event served 
to further undermine the idea that detainees could or should be 
brought to the mainland for trial and imprisonment or detention.  
Indeed, the Ghailani conviction could be said to have provided a 
perverse incentive to not prosecute detainees at all—in federal court 
or military commission—when there exists a more efficient alterna-
tive bearing the same result: continued detention of the individual 
without charge or trial in the current long-term detention system at 
Guantanamo. 
At the end of 2010—almost two years after President Obama is-
sued the executive order that called for closing Guantanamo within a 
year—the detention center at Guantanamo remained open with no 
future date set for its closure, nor any plan evident in support of its 
closure.   
The goal, however, of closing Guantanamo is something of a red 
herring.  Entirely too much hysteria and rhetoric has erupted around 
whether the prison camp should stay open or close.  Of greater signi-
ficance is that the continued existence of Guantanamo has enabled 
“detention without trial” or, to use more precise language, long-term 
military preventive detention, to become entrenched, indeed institu-
  
 22.  See, e.g., Geraldine Baum & Richard A. Serrano, Terrorist Gets Life Sen-
tence for Role in U.S. Embassy Bombings in East Africa, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 
2011, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/sc-dc-0126-embassy-
bombings-web-20110125,0,5584187.story?track=rss; Patricia Hurtado, Ghailani 
Cleared of All But One Charge in African Embassy Bombings Trial, BLOOMBERG 
(Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-17/ghailani-found-
guilty-of-conspiracy-in-embassy-bombings-cleared-of-murder.html; see also 
Ghailani Verdict Complicates Bid to Close Gitmo, CBS NEWS (Nov. 18, 2010), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/11/18/national/main7066595.shtml [herei-
nafter Ghailani Verdict].  
 23.  See, e.g., Ghailani Verdict, supra note 22; The Ghailani Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 19, 2010, at A30.  
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tionalized, in our democratic society.  Here, let us be clear about 
what this means: First, preventive detention is the indefinite deten-
tion of an individual who is believed to be too dangerous to release 
into society, but who will not be charged or prosecuted for any 
crime.24  Second, the individuals at Guantanamo are detained by the 
U.S. military and, as asserted by the President, the detentions have 
been, and are, pursuant to wartime and justified by the laws of war.25  
Thus, the continued existence of Guantanamo is, more accurately, 
about continuing the existence of military preventive detention. 
Closing Guantanamo is still a worthy goal for many reasons, but 
the hard question we should be asking is not simply whether the de-
tention camp should close, but whether America can abide long-term 
military preventive detention as an ongoing institution in our civil 
society even when we no longer have troops on the ground in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, or elsewhere.  With that query in mind, closing the 
prison is certainly important because of what it has come to stand 
for: Guantanamo, once a symbol for lawlessness, has become a sym-
bol for indefinite preventive detention under the law. 
II.  WHERE ARE WE NOW? (A POLITICAL MAELSTROM AND A 
PREMONITION) 
On December 22, 2010, a Democrat-controlled Congress passed 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 
  
 24. See Alec D. Walen, Crossing a Moral Line: Long-Term Preventive Detention 
in the War on Terror, 28 PHIL. & PUB. POL’Y Q. 15 (2008).  See generally David 
Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 
97 CAL. L. REV. 693, 700–03 (2009) (discussing different preventive-detention 
regimes and, particularly, preventive detention of terrorism suspects). 
 25. See, e.g., Respondent’s Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Deten-
tion Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, Hamlily v. Obama, 
No. 05-CV-0763 (JDB) (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009) (relying on the Authorization for 
Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) with reference to 
international law principles); GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 
8–9 (2010) [herinafter FINAL REPORT].  See generally 115 Stat. 224; Boumediene 
v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. 
Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Detention Military Order, supra note 9. 
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(“NDAA 2011”),26 which is far more restrictive than any bill on 
Guantanamo passed to date and severely impedes the ability of the 
executive branch to transfer detainees out of Guantanamo.  The 
NDAA 2011 essentially prohibits funds authorized by the Act to be 
used for the transfer or release of Guantanamo detainees to or within 
the United States (or its territories or possessions).27  The Act also 
requires certification from a foreign country in order for any funds 
authorized by the Act to be used for the transfer of any Guantanamo 
detainee to the custody of that foreign country.28  The foreign coun-
try must provide a whole host of assertions, including that it is not a 
sponsor of terrorism, has agreed to take steps to ensure that the indi-
vidual will not take action to threaten the United States or its citizens 
or allies, has taken the steps that the Secretary of Defense determines 
are necessary to ensure that the individual cannot engage in terror-
ism, and has agreed to share information with the United States re-
garding the individual or his associates that could affect the security 
of the United States or its citizens or allies, among others.29  The Act 
  
 26. Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. 
L. No. 111-383, 124 Stat. 4137 (2010) [hereinafter NDAA 2011].  
 27. Id. § 1032.  Section 1032 includes any detainee held on or after January 2009 
at the United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of 
Defense.  Id.  The section also specifically names Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as 
one such individual whose transfer with funds authorized by the Act is prohibited.  
Id.   
 28. Id. §1033(b).   
 29. Id.  Section 1033(b) states in full:  
CERTIFICATION.—The certification described in this subsection is a 
written certification made by the Secretary of Defense, with the concur-
rence of the Secretary of State, that the government of the foreign coun-
try or the recognized leadership of the foreign entity to which the indi-
vidual detained at  Guantanamo is to be transferred— 
  (1) is not a designated state sponsor of terrorism or a des-
ignated foreign terrorist organization;  
  (2) maintains effective control over each detention facility 
in which an individual is to be detained if the individual is to be 
housed in a detention facility; 
  (3) is not, as of the date of the certification, facing a threat 
that is likely to substantially affect its ability to exercise control 
over the individual;  
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also prohibits the use of funds to transfer any Guantanamo detainee 
to any country if there is a confirmed case of recidivism by a former 
Guantanamo detainee who was transferred to that country30 and pro-
hibits the use of Department of Defense (“DoD”) funds to modify or 
construct facilities in the United States to house Guantanamo detai-
nees for detention in the custody of the DoD.31 
  
  (4) has agreed to take effective steps to ensure that the in-
dividual cannot take action to threaten the United States, its cit-
izens, or its allies in the future;  
  (5) has taken such steps as the Secretary determines are ne-
cessary to ensure that the individual cannot engage or reengage 
in any terrorist activity; and  
  (6) has agreed to share any information with the United 
States that— 
(A) is related to the individual or any associates of 
the individual; and  
(B) could affect the security of the United States, its 
citizens, or its allies.  
Id.  The requirement for certification from a foreign country or entity does not 
apply to transfers of Guantanamo detainees by the Secretary of Defense which are 
to effectuate an order by a court or tribunal.  Id. § 1033(a)(2).  In other words, if a 
federal court grants a habeas petition to a Guantanamo detainee, which means the 
government no longer has the authority to detain him, the Secretary of Defense is 
not required to obtain certification from the foreign country or entity in order to 
transfer the detainee to his home country or other country, but must notify Con-
gress of such court order.  Id.  For examples of cases in which federal courts 
granted habeas petitions to Guantanamo detainees, see Abdah v. Obama, 04-CV-
1254 (D.D.C. May 26, 2010) and Al-Rabiah v. United States, 02-CV-828 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 17, 2009). 
 30. NDAA 2011, supra note 26, § 1033(c)(1).  The prohibition on transfer in 
cases of recidivism does not apply to transfers of Guantanamo detainees by the 
Secretary of Defense which are to effectuate an order by a court or tribunal.  Id. 
§ 1033(c)(3). 
 31. Id. § 1034.  Despite the restriction on the use of funds for a detention facility 
in the U.S. to house Guantanamo detainees, § 1034(d) also requires that the Secre-
tary of Defense submit a report to the congressional defense committees on “the 
merits, costs, and risks of using any proposed facility in the United States, its terri-
tories, or possessions to house any [Guantanamo detainees] for the purpose of 
detention or imprisonment in the custody or under the effective control of the De-
partment of Defense.”  The section cannot be referring to the Guantanamo deten-
tion center, as it is not located in the United States, its territories, or possessions.  
See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 471 (2004). 
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In summary, the NDAA 2011 completely destroys the ability of 
the executive branch to transfer any detainees from Guantanamo to 
the United States for prosecution in a federal civilian court for terror-
ism crimes under federal statute.32  The bill also makes it vastly 
more complicated for the President to transfer detainees to their 
home country or a safe third country due to the certification re-
quirement, which effectively forces the receiving foreign country to 
give up sovereignty with respect to how it conducts internal affairs 
relating to terrorism and its own citizens and residents.  Indeed, it is 
difficult to imagine the United States agreeing to share information 
about U.S. citizens and residents in the same broad terms that the 
NDAA 2011 provisions would require of other countries.  In effect, 
the certification requirement would make foreign countries “answer-
able” to the United States on issues of their own national security. 
Moreover, the bill’s intrusion into executive authority and discre-
tion is indisputably far reaching.  It is generally the prerogative of 
the Department of Justice to determine who and where to prosecute 
for violations of federal criminal statutes, just as it is normally with-
in the realm of the Department of State to determine when, where, 
and how to engage in foreign relations.  Not surprisingly, the sub-
stance of the NDAA 2011 and its incursion into the executive do-
main caused great displeasure in the White House such that some 
advisors to the President were advocating that he declare certain 
provisions unconstitutional.33  Certainly, an outright veto of the de-
fense spending bill while there are still U.S. service members fight-
ing in Iraq and Afghanistan was fairly out of the question.  Further, it 
  
 32. There are at least nine federal crimes relating to terrorism for which a sus-
pected terrorist, including a Guantanamo detainee, could be tried.  See, e.g., 18 
U.S.C. § 2339(a)–(b) (2006); see also RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, 
JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING TERRORISM 
CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 11–12 (2009). 
 33.  See Dafna Linzer, Administration Prepares to Defy Efforts to Limit Obama’s 
Options for Guantanamo, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 3, 2011),  http://www.propublica.org/ 
article/administration-prepares-to-defy-efforts-to-limit-obamas-options-for-
guantan; Eyder Peralta, Obama Signs Defense Bill that Limits His Options in 
Guantanamo, NPR (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2011/01/07/132746183/obama-signs-defense-bill-that-limits-his-options-in-
Guantanamo. 
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could have been viewed as overly confrontational by the new Repub-
lican majority in the House of Representatives. 
Whether for the aforementioned reasons and/or due to other rea-
sons, on January 7, 2011, President Obama signed the NDAA 2011 
into law but issued a signing statement that specifically addressed 
two of the bill’s provisions relating to Guantanamo: the restriction 
on transfer into the United States and the certification requirement 
from foreign countries.34  The statement is a fairly strong denounce-
ment of Congress’ attempt to intrude on executive prerogative, as-
serting that the Act “represents a dangerous and unprecedented chal-
lenge to critical executive branch authority” and “interfere[s] with 
the authority of the executive branch.”35 
  
 34. Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on H.R. 6523 
(Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/07/statement-
president-hr-6523 [hereinafter Signing Statement to NDAA 2011].  For an expla-
nation of the constitutionality of presidential signing statements in the context of 
the War on Terror, see Robert Turner, U.S. Constitutional Issues in the Struggle 
Against Terror, in LEGAL ISSUES IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERROR 105 (John 
Norton Moore and Robert F. Turner, eds., 2010). 
 35. Signing Statement to NDAA 2011, supra note 34.  Specifically, the signing 
statement includes the following two paragraphs: 
Section 1032 represents a dangerous and unprecedented challenge 
to critical executive branch authority to determine when and where 
to prosecute Guantanamo detainees, based on the facts and the cir-
cumstances of each case and our national security interests.  The 
prosecution of terrorists in Federal court is a powerful tool in our 
efforts to protect the Nation and must be among the options availa-
ble to us.  Any attempt to deprive the executive branch of that tool 
undermines our Nation’s counterterrorism efforts and has the po-
tential to harm our national security. 
. . . .  
[T]he restrictions on the transfer of detainees to the custody or ef-
fective control of foreign countries interfere with the authority of 
the executive branch to make important and consequential foreign 
policy and national security determinations regarding whether and 
under what circumstances such transfers should occur in the con-
text of an ongoing armed conflict.  We must have the ability to act 
swiftly and to have broad flexibility in conducting our negotiations 
with foreign countries. . . .  Requiring the executive branch to certi-
fy to additional conditions would hinder the conduct of delicate 
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Notably, President Obama concluded the signing statement with 
the declaration that his Administration “will work with the Congress 
to seek repeal of these restrictions, will seek to mitigate their effects, 
and will oppose any attempt to extend or expand them in the fu-
ture.”36  As a preliminary matter, it will be interesting to see exactly 
how the Administration will work with a Congress that now has a 
Republican majority in the House when even a Democrat-controlled 
Congress was not willing to close the prison camp.37  As a substan-
tive matter, the latter assertion—that the Administration “will op-
pose any attempt to extend or expand” the restrictions—could be 
interpreted to mean that the Administration genuinely intends to pur-
sue the closure of Guantanamo.  On the other hand, while the state-
ment protests legislative intrusion into foreign policy and national 
security matters, it fails to address the content of the NDAA provi-
sions, which virtually nullify, or at least greatly undermine, Obama’s 
2009 executive order to close Guantanamo.  Simply put, the state-
ment makes no claim to executive authority to close Guantanamo as 
a national security priority.38 
Whether one wants to conclude that the Obama Administration 
still intends to close Guantanamo or that the Administration merely 
wishes to be perceived as still desiring its closure for symbolic rea-
sons, one must recognize that the White House likely does not have 
the political support necessary to actually close it soon, if ever. 
  
negotiations with foreign countries and therefore the effort to con-
clude detainee transfers in accord with our national security.   
Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See, e.g., Jen DiMascio, McKeon Vows to Keep Gitmo Open, POLITICO (Jan. 
18, 2011), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0111/47761.html. 
 38. For comparison, the first half of the signing statement is explicit as to the 
Administration’s wish to prosecute detainees in federal courts in the United States.  
Signing Statement to NDAA 2011, supra note 34.  However, it does not have the 
same specificity with respect to closing Guantanamo; rather, it vaguely states that 
it must have flexibility in areas of foreign policy and “negotiations with foreign 
countries.”  Id.  Nowhere does the statement indicate that the NDAA 2011 inter-
feres with the previously claimed national security goal of closing the prison 
camp.   
File: Huskey- Vol. 9, Iss. 2, V3 Created on:  3/13/2011 1:11:00 AM Last Printed: 3/22/2011 12:26:00 AM 
196    UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 9, No. 2   
III.  WHERE ARE WE GOING? (THE FUTURE OF GUANTANAMO AND 
PREVENTIVE DETENTION) 
What does all this say about the future of Guantanamo and, con-
comitantly, preventive detention?  It is clear that the Administration 
faces an uphill battle if it intends to pursue closure of the prison 
camp.  In addition, there is no doubt that the Administration believes 
that the physical presence of Guantanamo is a national security con-
cern and that it should at least keep stating publicly that the prison 
should close.  As recently as December 2010, President Obama ex-
pressed the continued desire to close Guantanamo, saying it has 
“‘become a symbol’ and a recruiting tool for ‘al Qaeda and jihad-
ists.’”39  At the same time, however, it has become increasingly clear 
(or, clearer in my opinion), that the Obama Administration has no 
intention of ending long-term preventive detention regardless of 
what happens to the Guantanamo prison.  In the same speech in De-
cember, Obama also stated, “I think we can do just as good of a job 
housing [detainees] somewhere else.”40  Furthermore, recent reports 
of an impending executive order on preventive detention confirm 
that the Administration is actively considering the establishment of a 
detention regime beyond the current detention regime at Guantana-
mo.41 
That the Obama Administration is set to officially condone the 
practice of indefinite military preventive detention should not come 
as a surprise, as I believe it does to many.42  The clues have been 
  
 39. Peter Landers, Congress Bars Gitmo Transfers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870477460457603652069088585
8.html. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See, e.g., Peter Finn & Anne E. Kornblut, Indefinite Detention Possible for 
Suspects at Guantanamo Bay, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2010, at A3; Charlie Savage, 
Detainee Review Proposal Is Prepared for Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/22/us/22gitmo.html. 
 42. Based on my experience of speaking about Guantanamo and preventive de-
tention at various conferences and while on book tour in numerous cities, includ-
ing Albuquerque, Anchorage, Austin, Boston, Minneapolis, New York, Philadel-
phia, and Washington, D.C., I realized that most people did not quite recognize 
that Obama’s promise to shut Guantanamo down was not a promise to discontinue 
detaining people without trial in a preventive-detention regime.  Indeed, those 
experiences were partially the impetus for writing this article.   
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there all along, even as the White House was fervently advocating 
for the closure of Guantanamo.  First, the same 2009 executive order 
calling for closure retains the option of continued detention without 
trial on the table by specifically allowing the Guantanamo Review 
Task Force—newly established to review each detainee’s case—to 
reach a determination for a “disposition” other than transfer or pros-
ecution.43  Second, just months later, in an important speech on na-
tional security, President Obama made it clear that detaining indi-
viduals without trial may be a necessary last-choice option, and, to 
that end, a preventive-detention regime was entirely acceptable: 
We are not going to release anyone if it would endanger our 
national security . . . .  Where demanded by justice and na-
tional security, we will seek to transfer some detainees to the 
same type of facilities in which we hold all manner of dan-
gerous and violent criminals within our borders -- namely, 
highly secure prisons that ensure the public safety. 
. . . .  
Now, finally, there remains the question of detainees at 
Guantanamo who cannot be prosecuted yet who pose a clear 
danger to the American people. . . . We’re going to exhaust 
every avenue that we have to prosecute those at Guantanamo 
who pose a danger to our country.  But even when this 
process is complete, there may be a number of people who 
cannot be prosecuted for past crimes, in some cases because 
evidence may be tainted, but who nonetheless pose a threat to 
the security of the United States. . . .   
. . . Having said that, we must recognize that these deten-
tion policies cannot be unbounded.  They can’t be based 
simply on what I or the executive branch decide alone.  
  
 43. Specifically, § 4(c)(4) of Executive Order 13,492 allows for the interagency 
task force review to reach a “Determination of Other Disposition,” that is, “[w]ith 
respect to any individuals currently detained at Guantanamo whose disposition is 
not achieved under paragraphs (2) [transfer] or (3) [prosecution] of this subsection, 
the Review shall select lawful means, consistent with the national security and 
foreign policy interests of the United States and the interests of justice, for the 
disposition of such individuals.”  Executive Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 
4899 (Jan. 27, 2009). 
File: Huskey- Vol. 9, Iss. 2, V3 Created on:  3/13/2011 1:11:00 AM Last Printed: 3/22/2011 12:26:00 AM 
198    UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 9, No. 2   
That’s why my administration has begun to reshape the stan-
dards that apply to ensure that they are in line with the rule of 
law.  We must have clear, defensible, and lawful standards 
for those who fall into this category.  We must have fair pro-
cedures so that we don’t make mistakes.  We must have a 
thorough process of periodic review, so that any prolonged 
detention is carefully evaluated and justified.44 
Third, in January 2010, the executively created Guantanamo Re-
view Task Force released its final report, indicating that there were 
almost fifty men at Guantanamo who could neither be tried nor re-
leased but who would be subject to detention and continuing “execu-
tive review.”45 
Now, recent reports confirm what has been quietly occurring all 
along: The White House has been preparing an executive order that 
sets forth a system of indefinite detention at Guantanamo and, poten-
tially, elsewhere.46  In short, this system would enable detainees to 
challenge their detention on a regular basis by requiring a minimal 
review every six months and then a more lengthy annual review be-
fore an executive ‘parole-like’ review board made up of officials 
from civilian and military agencies.47  Further, the pending executive 
order envisions that the executive review board would have the au-
thority to release a detainee if appropriate.48  Of course, with the 
NDAA 2011 restrictions in place, the review board’s authority to 
order the release of any detainee at Guantanamo would be severely 
restrained.  It is important to note that such an executive review 
  
 44. Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President on National Se-
curity (May 21, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-
the-President-On-National-Security-5-21-09. 
 45. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at ii (“[Forty-eight] detainees were deter-
mined to be too dangerous to transfer but not feasible for prosecution.”).  Pursuant 
to executive order, a task force made up of various agencies was established to 
make a prompt and comprehensive review and determination of disposition of 
each individual detainee at Guantanamo.  See 74 Fed. Reg. at 4898–99. 
 46. See, e.g., Finn & Kornblut, supra note 41. 
 47. Dafna Linzer, White House Drafts Executive Order for Indefinite Detention, 
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.propublica.org/article/white-house-
drafts-executive-order-for-indefinite-detention.  Detainees would also have access 
to an attorney to assist them in the process.  Id.   
 48. See id. 
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process would not replace the habeas reviews required by the Su-
preme Court in Boumediene, but would supplement it.49  In essence, 
the executive review would weigh the necessity of the detention ra-
ther than its lawfulness, which is what the federal courts have been 
doing in the ongoing habeas hearings pursuant to Boumediene’s 
mandate.50 
The fact of continuing habeas reviews of detainees leads us to 
face the reality on the ground: as of January 2011, there are approx-
imately 173 men still detained at Guantanamo, many of who have 
been there since 2002.51  Of the 173, a large number have been des-
ignated by the Guantanamo Review Task Force as eligible for re-
lease but remain at Guantanamo because of the White House-
imposed moratorium on sending Guantanamo detainees back to Ye-
men on account of the “Christmas Bomber,” who trained in Ye-
men.52  Additionally, the Task Force designated almost forty-five 
men as appropriate for prosecution, though it is far from certain 
when such prosecutions will take place.53  That still leaves a number 
  
 49. Id.  An executive order could not override a right clearly granted by the Su-
preme Court, such as the right to seek habeas relief granted in Boumediene v.  
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795 (2008).  Cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 575–84 
(2006) (concluding that the President’s military order establishing military com-
missions was invalid). 
 50. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 793–95.  A habeas petition allows a detainee to 
challenge the government’s authority to detain him.  Id.  Therefore, the habeas 
cases test whether the government can prove it has a legal and factual basis to 
detain the individual.  See, e.g., Obaydullah v. Obama, No. 08-1173 (RJL), 2010 
WL 4116731, at *7 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2010); Hatim v. Obama, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1, 
3–5 (D.D.C. 2009); Al-Odah v. Obama, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17–18 (D.D.C. 2009).  
See generally HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST & THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, HABEAS 
WORKS: FEDERAL COURTS’ PROVEN CAPACITY TO HANDLE GUANTÁNAMO CASES 
(2010), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/414.pdf. 
 51. See Peter Finn & Anne E. Kornblut, President Decries Rules on Detainees, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2011, at A2; US: Act on Pledge to Close Guantanamo: Inde-
finite Detention Nine Years Later with No End in Sight, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 
10, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/01/10/us-act-pledge-close-
guantanamo.  
 52. U.S. to Suspend Gitmo Detainee Transfers to Yemen, FOX NEWS (Jan. 5, 
2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/01/05/suspend-gitmo-detainee-
transfers-yemen/; White House: No Detainees to Yemen for Now, USA TODAY, 
Jan. 5, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-01-05-Yemen_N.htm. 
 53. FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at ii. 
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of men who will continue with their detentions without being prose-
cuted for criminal acts.  These men, however, have the right to chal-
lenge their detentions.  Since 2008, all the men at Guantanamo have 
been entitled under Boumediene to challenge their detention in fed-
eral court through habeas corpus petitions.54  Accordingly, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia has been holding habeas 
hearings for almost three years now.  As of January 2, 2011, a tally 
of the completed habeas cases reveals that thirty-eight grants of ha-
beas have been issued, nine of which the Department of Justice is 
appealing.55  The government has won nineteen habeas cases, sever-
al of which have already been affirmed by the D.C. Circuit.56  This 
means that in roughly thirty cases, a federal court determined that, 
under the Authorization for Use of Military Force, the government 
has the authority to continue to detain an individual because he ei-
ther is “part of” al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces, or pur-
posefully provided substantial or material support to such forces.57  
Thus, military preventive detention is already occurring at Guanta-
namo.  It is not a question of whether there should be a preventive-
detention regime but, rather, whether the current one is appropriate 
and what that means for any future regime. 
As noted above, the detentions at Guantanamo exist within a mil-
itary paradigm, that is, the detainees are in the custody of the U.S. 
military.  The President, as well as many others, have claimed that 
the right to detain individuals without trial is justified by the exis-
tence of a “wartime” (i.e., the current global war against al-Qaeda 
and associated forces) and by underlying principles of the laws of 
war.58  The Guantanamo detentions, and whether such detentions are 
legal or appropriate under the laws of war and law of armed conflict 
  
 54. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797–98. 
 55. Lyle Denniston, Boumediene: The Record So Far, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 2, 
2011, 11:44 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/01/boumediene. 
 56. Id. (follow “Table 2” hyperlink); see also Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8, 
17 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2010); 
Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 
866, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc denied, 619 F.3d 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 57. See, e.g., Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 747 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Al-Adahi v. 
Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 418, 432; 
Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872.  
 58. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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(called “international humanitarian law” or IHL), have generated an 
abundance of scholarship and commentary with divergent views.59  
For the purpose of this article, I do not propose to discuss the intrica-
cies of these legal debates, such as whether the war against al-Qaeda 
is an international or non-international conflict or whether some or 
all of the Geneva Conventions or other IHL apply to the detainees.  
Rather, the point of raising the wartime paradigm and the laws of 
war with respect to detention at Guantanamo is a simple one—the 
war against al-Qaeda has no temporal or geographical boundaries, 
and, therefore, the military detention regime at Guantanamo is simi-
larly without such boundaries.  In other words, under the current 
preventive-detention regime, the President claims the authority to 
pick up any individual anywhere in the world and hold that individu-
al in military detention without trial for as long as the United States 
is “at war” with al-Qaeda (or associated forces), provided that the 
individual is “part of” al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces or 
has purposefully provided substantial or material support to such 
groups.60     
This proposition is neither exaggerated nor constrained to the 
unique cases of the Guantanamo detentions.  First, it is well estab-
lished that a number of Guantanamo detainees were not captured on 
any “battlefield” or even in Afghanistan.61  Second, in the recent 
  
 59. See, e.g., John B. Bellinger, III, Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism, 8 
GERMAN L.J. 735 (2007), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/ 
Vol08No07/PDF_Vol_08_No_07_735-746_Developments_Bellinger.pdf; Curtis 
A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005); Ryan Goodman, The Detention of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 48 (2009); Laura M. Olson, Prac-
tical Challenges of Implementing the Complementarity Between International 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law—Demonstrated by the Procedural Regula-
tion of Internment in Non-International Armed Conflict, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 
L. 437 (2009); Gabor Rona, A Bull in a China Shop: The War on Terror and In-
ternational Law in the United States, 39 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 135 (2008); Gabor 
Rona, Legal Frameworks to Combat Terrorism: An Abundant Inventory of Exist-
ing Tools, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 499 (2005).   
 60. See Salahi, 625 F.3d at 747; Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1103; Barhoumi, 609 F.3d 
at 418; Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872. 
 61. See Salahi, 625 F.3d at 750 (petitioner was captured in Mauritania); Ben-
sayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (petitioner and five other 
Algerian citizens were residing in Bosnia when they were turned over to U.S. au-
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percolation of habeas cases, the D.C. Circuit has been unwilling to 
constrain the scope of the government’s detention authority by geo-
graphical boundaries, as evidenced by Salahi v. Obama and Ben-
sayah v. Obama.  In Salahi, a Mauratanian citizen captured in Mau-
ratania, who was not even alleged to be in combat in or near Afgha-
nistan and, in fact, had not been to Afghanistan since 1992, was nev-
ertheless alleged to be “part of” al-Qaeda at the time of capture.62  In 
Bensayah, an Algerian citizen who was arrested in Bosnia was not 
alleged to have been in Afghanistan at all; rather, the government 
contended that he was planning to travel there to take up arms 
against the United States and allied forces.63  In each case, the gov-
ernment claimed authority to militarily detain the petitioner because 
he was allegedly “part of” al-Qaeda, irrespective of where the peti-
tioner was captured or whether he had engaged in actual combat or 
hostilities.64  Furthermore, in neither case did the D.C. Circuit ad-
dress the geographical factor.  In terms of preventive detention, this 
failure to constrain the boundaries of the “armed conflict,” much less 
recognize that such concepts exist under the law, does great disser-
vice to IHL.  More significantly, this failure by the D.C. Circuit illu-
strates the degree to which the courts are willing to accept the estab-
lishment of an indefinite preventive-detention regime based on a 
“war” that spans the globe. 
Finally, another detention case involving detainees at the U.S. 
Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan further elucidates the geographical-
ly expansive detention authority to which the Obama Administration 
is laying claim.  In Al Maqaleh v. Gates,65 detainees at Bagram peti-
  
thorities and transported to Guantanamo); MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA 
DENBEAUX, REPORT ON GUANTANAMO DETAINEES: A PROFILE OF 517 DETAINEES 
THROUGH ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DATA 14 (2006), available at 
http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/guantanamo_report_final_2_0
8_06.pdf (over sixty percent of the detainees brought to Guantanamo were picked 
up in Pakistan by non-U.S. authorities); Michele Norris, All Things Considered: 
Documents Shed Light on Guantanamo Detainees, NPR (Mar. 6, 2006),  
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=5248091 (radio 
broadcast interview with Corine Hegland, reporter for The National Journal).  
 62. Salahi, 625 F.3d at 746, 748–50. 
 63. Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 721. 
 64. Salahi, 625 F.3d at 746; Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 722.  
 65. 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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tioned the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for relief 
from their confinement by the U.S. military.66  One detainee, a Tuni-
sian citizen, alleged that he was captured in Pakistan, and another, a 
Yemeni citizen, alleged that he was captured in Thailand.67  Both 
detainees claimed that they were held in an unknown location before 
being brought to the U.S. detention camp at Bagram.68  Although the 
issue before the court was not the scope of U.S. detention authority 
but rather the reach of the Suspension Clause, on appeal, the D.C. 
Circuit merely noted that the petitioners had been captured abroad.69  
The D.C. District Court, however, had previously addressed the site 
of apprehension with more caution, noting that the four petitioners 
claimed to have been captured outside of Afghanistan and rendered 
to Bagram to be detained by the United States and that they had no 
prior connection with Afghanistan.70  The court then made the keen 
observation that:  
It is one thing to detain those captured on the sur-
rounding battlefield at a place like Bagram, which 
respondents correctly maintain is in a theater of war. 
It is quite another thing to apprehend people in for-
eign countries—far from any Afghan battlefield—and 
then bring them to a theater of war, where the Consti-
tution arguably may not reach.  Such rendition resur-
rects the same specter of limitless Executive power 
the Supreme Court sought to guard against in Boume-
diene—the concern that the Executive could move 
detainees physically beyond the reach of the Constitu-
tion and detain them indefinitely.71 
  
 66. Id. at 87. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 96.  Initially, there were four petitioners in the D.C. District Court who 
claimed they were captured in Pakistan, Dubai, Thailand and somewhere outside 
of Afghanistan, while respondents disputed only some of those claims.  Al Maqa-
leh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209–210 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d, 605 F.3d 84 
(D.C. Cir. 2010). 
  70.  Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 220. 
  71.  Id. 
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Though the captures in Al Maqaleh were carried out during the Bush 
Administration, the case continued into the Obama Administration, 
which essentially sought to avoid federal court review of military 
detentions of individuals picked up well outside any active war zone.   
Thus, the Obama Administration and the courts, by way of the 
Guantanamo habeas cases and other detention cases, are laying the 
foundation for an institutionalized system of military preventive de-
tention at Guantanamo for sure, but perhaps at Bagram as well, and 
if President Obama is successful in his quest to close Guantanamo, 
potentially in U.S. locations also.  The militarization of any 
processes in our civilian society should be viewed with caution.  Fur-
thermore, another factor, in addition to the lack of temporal and geo-
graphical boundaries, makes these types of detentions extremely 
problematic.  Unlike previous armed conflicts where the enemy wore 
a uniform, in this “war” against al-Qaeda there is no perfect way to 
identify an “enemy” who does not wear a uniform.  Thus, the current 
detention regime allows for U.S. forces or the CIA to pick up any 
individual (who is dressed as a civilian) anywhere, provided that the 
individual is suspected of being a member of al-Qaeda or associated 
forces—regardless of whether he engaged in hostilities—and detain 
him in military custody until the end of the “war” without bringing 
criminal charges or prosecuting him for a crime.  Of course, this war 
may not have an end and, therefore, the detention could be indefi-
nite.  Finally, it is not at all clear what kind of access, if any, such a 
detainee would have to his family and to the outside world or, more 
generally, what the conditions of indefinite confinement might look 
like and whether they would be akin to conditions in federal prisons, 
which are penal in nature.  This adds another layer of concern upon 
an already problematic detention regime.   
The Hamdi v. Rumsfeld72 case is often cited by courts and com-
mentators alike for the proposition that preventive detention is per-
mitted as an “incident to war.”73  Yet, the plurality was not making 
statements of generality and concluded merely that detention au-
thority under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force at least 
extended to persons who engaged in a particular combination of past 
  
  72.  542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
  73.  Id. at 518. 
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conduct and associational status: bearing arms as part of a Taliban 
military unit in Afghanistan.74  The Court went on to caution that its 
understanding was based on longstanding law-of-war principles and 
that “[i]f the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely 
unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the 
law of war, that understanding may unravel.”75  Almost ten years 
after 9/11, with a military preventive-detention regime that has a 
capacity to reach globally and last indefinitely, we have surpassed 
that “unraveling” point.  The question is whether we should be will-
ing to accept the unraveling of our civilian democracy and its 
processes as easily as we seem to be accepting the institutionaliza-
tion of military preventive detention.   
 
  
  74.  Id. at 517–18. 
  75.  Id. at 521. 
